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Abstract
Money flow models are essential tools to understand different economical
phenomena, like saving propensities and wealth distributions. In spite of their
importance, most of them are based on synthetic transaction networks with
simple topologies, e.g. random or scale-free ones, as the characterisation of
real networks is made difficult by the confidentiality and sensitivity of money
transaction data. Here we present an analysis of the topology created by real
credit card transactions from one of the biggest world banks, and show how
different distributions, e.g. number of transactions per card or amount, have
nontrivial characteristics. We further describe a stochastic model to create
transactions data sets, feeding from the obtained distributions, which will
allow researchers to create more realistic money flow models.
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1. Introduction
One of the many relevant open problems in economics, and more recently
in econophysics, is the understanding of the basic mechanisms driving in-
come or wealth distribution in various economic communities, for instance
in different countries. While it has been shown that the associated probabil-
ity distribution for the whole population roughly follows a power-law, also
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known as Pareto distribution [1], and that the low-income population is bet-
ter described by a Gibbs distribution [2], less is known about the mechanisms
generating these distributions.
The models proposed in the literature [3], typically include the money
flow between agents, and their saving propensity. Most of the studies consider
random interactions between agents [2, 4], or even mean-field approximations
[5, 6], in which all agents interact with all others, two clearly unrealistic as-
sumptions that do not reflect the reality of economic transactions. A few
studies allow agents to interact above more complex topologies [7, 8, 9, 10].
However, the synthetic network models (e.g. scale-free networks [11]) are not
based on real observations. The information on everyday monetary transac-
tions is often considered sensitive. The resulting scarcity of available data
represents a severe limitation and explains why very few studies have tack-
led this issue, mainly resorting to the possibilities offered by new on-line
technologies, e.g. BitCoins [12].
The modelling of money flows bears some similarities with that of mod-
elling the information or opinion spreading in a social network. In this field of
research too the initial models only considered simple topologies [13, 14], but
it was soon realised that the structures created by interactions between peo-
ple [15] and the time-varying organisation of these interactions [16, 17, 18]
both have a dramatic impact on how faithfully the models translates the
underlying spreading process.
Thus, in analogy with the approach followed in social sciences, one may
ask whether and to what degree the transaction topologies are important
for creating realistic money flow models. In this contribution, we make one
step in this direction by describing and analysing a unique large-scale data
set, including all credit and debit card transactions realised in Spain between
2011 and 2012 within the network of one of the biggest Spanish banks. This
includes information for both transactions identified as normal and for those
identified as fraudulent.
We assume that money flows can be represented as a two-layer network
[19], with users on one layer, and stores (or more generally, any economic
activity) on the other. Card transactions then represent flows going from
the first to the second layer. To this, other types of flows should be added:
inter-users (e.g. transfer of money among members of a family); inter-stores
(i.e. commercial activities); and from stores to users (i.e. salaries). Clearly,
the analysis of card transactions alone allows a limited representation of the
whole system; furthermore, it does not account for transactions executed in
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cash. While this analysis presents some important limitations, it has to be
noted that it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first of its kind; while this
reduced view is in line with previous studies [12], it represents at the same
time a picture of the real economy, and not just a virtual one. Additionally,
the possibility of analysing the dynamics of illegal transactions enables a first
attempt to characterise the “black economy”, something which has seldom
been done in the past.
The content of the work is organised as follows. Section 2 describes
the main characteristics of the legal transactions, and thus characterises the
network topology of links created between the user and the store layers.
Section 3 presents some results related to illegal transactions. Finally, some
conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Transactions analysis
As previously introduced, the studied data set accounts for all credit and
debit card transactions of clients of the Spanish bank BBVA, from January
2011 to December 2012. Each month, an average of 15 million operations
were realised by 7 million cards, for a total of 250 GB of information. Avail-
able fields included a time stamp of the operation, the quantity (both in Euro
and in the original currency, if different), and the origin (the card) and desti-
nation (the store) of the operation; the two latter fields were anonymised, so
that the exact card number and the name of the store could not be recovered.
Additionally, information on the outcome of the operation was included, i.e.
whether the operation was detected as illegal or denied for any other reason.
In this section, only legal and accepted operations are examined.
Fig. 1 Left and Right respectively represent the cumulative probability
distribution (CPD) of the number of operations per card, and the operation
size (in Euro). The CPD, with respect to a given parameter value v, accounts
for the probability of finding an operation with at least value v, i.e. P (v) =
p(vi > v) with i running all over operations. In Fig. 1 Left, ki is thus the
number of operations performed by card i in one month; on the other hand, in
Fig. 1 Right, qi is the quantity of money involved in operation i. While both
graphs suggest a scale-free distribution, with long tails, this approximation is
far from being precise. Specifically, the number of operations per card seems
to display three regions of different slope: between 1 and 20, between 20 and
200, and above 200 operations per months, suggesting that different types of
users are included. This is further confirmed by Fig. 1 Right, in which there
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Figure 1: Analysis of credit card transactions. (Left) Cumulative probability distribution
of the number of operations realised by different cards. (Right) Cumulative probability
distribution of the amount (in Euro) of each transaction.
is a marked jump at 600 Euro; this is due to the fact that this quantity is,
by default, the maximum that can be withdrawn with a debit card in Spain.
Beyond the description of the static, or averaged, topology, it is also of
interest to evaluate how transactions change and evolve through time. In
particular, it is important to examine whether decisions of using a card are
related to past decisions. To shed light on this issue, Fig. 2 Top depicts the
cumulative (Left panel) and normal (Right panel) probability distribution
corresponding to the time passed between two consecutive operations of the
same card. Three curves are represented, corresponding to cards which have
realised 5, 15 and 25 operations in a single month - thus representing the
spectrum of normal users. A clear oscillatory dynamics of 24h period is
present in Fig. 2 Top Right - which is partly smoothed out in the cumulative
representation. This indicates that, especially for a low number of operations,
users are characterised by a periodic behaviour, in which similar operations
are performed at the same time of the day - e.g. one may tend to visit
the gas station at the same hour in the morning, or pay a parking always
after work. Fig. 2 Bottom further depicts how cards reappear in consecutive
days, by showing the number of new cards (i.e those that did not operate
the previous day) and of repeating ones. It can be seen that most of them
are not repeating in consecutive days, indicating that most of the users do
not use the same card within two days.
Finally, Fig. 3 shows how operations depend on the day of the week (Top
panels) and on the hour of the day (Bottom panels). As may be expected,
operations are reduced during Sunday, but not during Saturday - as people
use their credit cards in their leisure activities. There is also an important
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Figure 2: Analysis of user behaviours. Top Left and Right panels respectively depict the
cumulative and normal probability distribution of the time passed between two consecutive
operations. Black (top), red (middle) and green (bottom) curves respectively represent
the average for users with 5, 15 and 25 operations per month. The Bottom panel presents
the number of cards operating per day, divided between new cards (i.e those that did not
operate the previous day, red bars) and repeating ones (blue bars).
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Figure 3: Distribution of hourly and daily activities. Top and bottom graphs respectively
represent the distribution of operations during the seven days of the week, and the 24 hours
of a day. Left panels correspond to the number of transactions, right ones to the normalised
amount of operations.
reduction of the card activity during night hours, with two marked peaks at
Spanish lunch and dinner time (13:00 - 14:00 and 20:00 - 22:00).
3. Illicit transactions
In this section, we focus on those transactions that were marked as il-
licit by the bank’s fraud prevention software1. Fig. 4 Top Left presents the
CPD of the operation size (in blue), compared to the one obtained for legal
transactions (light grey). The former distribution presents a higher proba-
bility for large transaction sizes, suggesting that attackers prefer to operate
large transactions - which are more profitable when successful. Additionally,
Fig. 4 Top Right depicts the CPD for the time between consecutive ille-
gal transactions - all transactions are considered together, as the identity of
the attacker is not known; and Fig. 4 Bottom depicts the evolution of the
number of illegal transactions during December 20112.
1Due to confidentiality issues, details about this system have been omitted.
2Due to confidentiality reasons, the number of illegal transactions has been normalised
in the range [0, 1].
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Figure 4: Analysis of illicit transactions. (Top left) Cumulative probability distribution
of the amount (in Euro) of illegal transactions; the curve corresponding to legal ones is
reported in grey. (Top right) Cumulative probability distribution of the time between two
consecutive illegal transactions. (Bottom) Time evolution of the normalised number of
transactions for December 2011.
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4. A model for synthesising transactions
The problem of data confidentiality seldom allows researchers to test a
money flow model on a real data set, i.e. describing real transactions taken
place within an economical system. In order to bridge this gap, we here
present a model able to synthesise a set of transactions starting from the real
probability distributions previously obtained. In this section, we are going to
describe its general organisation - a more detailed description of its functions
can be found in Appendix A, and its validation is discussed in Appendix B.
The model starts by defining a set of initial credit cards and stores. Each
one of them is characterised by an identification number, and by an expected
size, i.e. the number of transactions that are expected to take place in a given
time window. No restriction is imposed on the relation between the number
of cards and stores. Due to this, the size of the former is strict, meaning
that each card is expected on average to execute the assigned number of
transactions; on the contrary, the size of stores is relative, and is used only in
a proportional way. This flexibility allows creating synthetic data sets with
different sizes, i.e. from the original system up to small test cases.
Once both sets have been initialised, the algorithm creates transactions
in a sequential manner. For each day in the specified time window, the
algorithm sequentially selects all cards, one by one, calculates the number
of expected transactions (also taking into account the day of the week), and
stores those transactions in memory. To these, three more attributes are
linked: the hour of the day (according to the provided distribution), the
store, and the size of the transaction. Notice how these three attributes
are independent from the card executing the transactions; in other words,
second order distributions are not considered. In spite of this, the model is
able to recreate all the most important features of the real transaction set -
see Appendix B for the results of the validation process.
The synthetic model further includes two options, which allow the cre-
ation of a more rich variety of user behaviours. The first one is designed
to reduce the determinism of the model, and allows introducing a “burst”
behaviour in card dynamics. Suppose the model is simulating a credit card,
expected to execute 15 operations per month. This corresponds to 0.5 op-
erations per day, or, in other words, on average one operation every two
days. The real behaviour of transactions is nevertheless different, as repre-
sented in Fig. 3: even cards expected to execute few operations every month
have some probability of executing those transactions in a single day, i.e. to
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present a “burst” dynamics. In order to simulate this, the model can intro-
duce a tuneable amount of variability in the number of daily transactions; if
a card executes more transactions than the expected average, an inhibition
is saved for the following days, in order to recover the equilibrium.
The second option allows to randomly swap cards, and introduces a higher
degree of heterogeneity in the model. It consists of a random process that
exchange the expected average activity of two cards with a given probability,
if some constraints (e.g. similarity between cards) are fulfilled.
5. Conclusions
Network science has had a fabulous development in the last twenty years,
and is having a huge impact on a multitude of fields, from social sciences to
biomedicine [20]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no model of credit
card transactions has been proposed based on a multi-layer complex network
point of view [19]. In this work, we have described a stochastic model to
create transaction data sets, feeding from the distributions obtained after a
detailed analysis of the topology created by real credit card transactions from
one of the biggest world banks between 2011 and 2012. Unlike other models
proposed in the literature, which typically consider random interactions and
money flows between agents, our approach assumes that money flows can
be represented as a two-layer network, with users laying on one layer and
stores on the other, and that card transactions represent flows going from
the first to the second layer. In the future we plan to explore other approaches
based on larger and more detailed multilayer network representations, e.g.
by considering different layers for different types of stores, and how users can
be classified in a number of ways. We hope our model will allow researchers
to create more realistic money flow models.
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Appendix A. Synthetic transactions model: structure and usage
The model has been developed as a set of Python libraries, which can
be downloaded at www.mzanin.com/MoneyFlow. Files, and functions within,
are organised as follows:
SynthTransactions. Main file of the library, it contains the following func-
tions:
• CreateTransactions. This is the main function that creates the
synthetic data set. Several parameters are accepted as input: the
number of users and stores, the time window covered by the data
set, etc. - see the file itself for a full list. The output is a list,
each element describing a single transaction and containing five
fields: the day, the identification of the user, the hour, the quantity
involved in the transaction, and the identification of the store.
• NormalizeDistributions. Internal function that normalises distri-
butions.
SynthTransactions InputData. This file includes the definition of the vari-
ables encoding the probabilities distributions to be used in the trans-
action synthesis. Values provided in the original file represent real
transactions, but can be changed as needed. They include:
• HourlyDistr, the distribution of transactions across the 24 hours
of the day.
• DailyDistr, the distribution of transactions across the seven days
of the week.
• QuantityDistr, 50 values that describe the distribution of transac-
tion sizes, in steps of 25 monetary units.
• NumOpsDistr, 100 values describing the probability distribution
of the monthly number of transactions per card.
• NumOpsDistrStores, describing the probability distribution of the
number of transactions of stores. 50 values are expected, in steps
of 20.
SynthTransactions TestFunctions. Set of functions allowing the recreation
of the graphs presented in this paper. The matplotlib Python library is
12
used to plot the results. The obtained distributions are also returned
for further processing.
TestProgram. A simple test program, showing how to setup and run the
model.
In order to create a synthetic data set, it is only necessary to run the main
CreateTransactions function with a suitable set of parameters. For instance,
the following code allows creating a data set comprising 2000 cards, 1000
stores, and transactions corresponding to 100 days:
Transactions = CreateTransactions(2000, 1000, 100)
A sample of the result, including three transactions and as stored in
Transactions, is here reported:
(0, 1, 17, 87.5, 78)
(0, 1, 17, 37.5, 544)
(0, 2, 13, 62.5, 68)
Appendix B. Synthetic transactions model: validation
The validation of the model has been executed by creating a set of syn-
thetic transactions, and by comparing the resulting probabilities distributions
with the one observed in real data. Results are presented in Fig. B.5, for
a data set comprising 2.000 cards, 1.000 stores, and 100 days, for a total
of 92.500 transactions. Black and green bars respectively correspond to the
distributions obtained for real and synthetic transactions.
Both sets of distributions present remarkable similarities - notice that
some of them, like the distribution of the time between subsequent transac-
tions of a same card, are not hard-coded in the model. The differences that
can be observed in the last panel of Fig. B.5 are due to the limited number
of stores, which creates a finite size effect.
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Figure B.5: Validation of the synthetic model for creating transaction sets. Black and
green bars respectively represent the probability distributions obtained from real and syn-
thetic data. From left to right, top to bottom, the six panels represent: (i) the distribution
of the number of transactions per user (credit card); (ii) distribution of amount of each
transaction; (iii) distribution according to the day of the week; (iv) distribution according
to the hour of the day; (v) distribution between consecutive transactions of the same card;
and (vi) distribution of the number of transactions per store.
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